On December 30th, 2024, Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Taliban’s Interior Minister and leader of the Haqqani Network, held meeting with the Chinese Ambassador to Kabul, Zhao Xing, to discuss the strategic importance of the Wakhan Corridor and the potential for increased trade. Amidst reports of clashes along the Durand Line between Taliban and Pakistani forces, and speculation regarding Pakistan’s intentions to occupy the WC, a meeting was called. The speculation was subsequently rejected by Pakistan, which affirmed that the area concerned is located in Afghanistan. “We recognize its sovereignty and territorial integrity,” foreign office said. The incident has renewed attention to the strategic importance of the slender landmass linking Afghanistan to India, Pakistan, China, and Tajikistan.
The corridor was an outcome of the great game between British and Russian empire. These empires collaborated at the end of the 19th century, establishing Afghanistan’s borders—and including the WC—to prevent their territories from sharing a border. Afghanistan thus served as an effective buffer.[i] The geopolitical context has shaped various analyses of the corridor’s strategic significance over time. Over the past two decades, the corridor has been viewed as a potential gateway for extremist forces in South and Central Asia.
In light of the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover of Afghanistan, a new framework for understanding the strategic value of the WC is necessary. China’s expanding economic presence in Central Asia and Pakistan provides crucial context for understanding this. Securing geopolitical interests in this strategically crucial area has necessitated the prioritization of new supply chain development and enhanced security measures by the Taliban and neighboring countries.
Emerging Security Construct
The meeting between Sirajuddin Haqqani and the Chinese ambassador highlights key players and their interests in the ongoing conflict in WC. The WC, situated in the neighboring province of Badakhshan, houses most Al-Qaeda training camps, according to a UN report released in July 2024. Sayf Al-Adl, an Al-Qaeda leader, issued a call in June 2024 for international followers to move to Afghanistan. The Haqqani network is closely tied to al-Qaeda and the China-focused ETIM terrorist group. In the past, Uighurs, along with other AQ terrorists, were the primary transnational Jihadis seeking shelter with Haqqani in North Waziristan, Pakistan.[1] The Turkmenistan Islamic Party was established in Afghanistan’s Khost Province in 1997 by Hasan Makdum, with support from Haqqani.[2]
With its intelligence apparatus already established in Afghanistan, China was fully aware of these events. A similar module was discovered in December 2020, following the arrest of ten Chinese intelligence officers in Kabul. Concerned about security threats from Afghanistan, China reinforced its border with the WC and deployed troops to Tajikistan in 2016. In addition to other efforts, China trained Afghan National Army personnel and aided in the formation of their mountain brigade. Even with China’s focus on security against threats emanating from the WC, attacks on Chinese nationals and Pakistani security forces within Pakistan have become more frequent since 2021. The attack was allegedly perpetrated by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has strong connections with the Afghan Taliban and, in particular, the Haqqani Network. To avoid antagonizing the Taliban, China initially let Pakistan handle the matter and protect Chinese citizens at any cost. Considering the strategic and economic benefits, China opted to cultivate its established relationship with the Taliban leadership. China’s consistent affirmations of Afghanistan’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity across various platforms subtly implied a potential Chinese security role for Afghanistan.
The Taliban refused Pakistan’s request to cease supporting the TTP. Sirajuddin Haqqani and other Taliban leaders urged Pakistan to resolve the TTP issue peacefully, calling it an internal matter. The Taliban denies involvement in attacks on Chinese citizens, and accused Pakistan of intentionally undermining Afghanistan-China relations.
Despite this, intermittent assaults on Chinese citizens and Pakistani military personnel persisted. Subsequently, skirmishes broke out between Pakistan and Afghanistan, key countries in China’s westward ambitions. China has consistently promoted trilateral dialogues with these nations, emphasizing practical cooperation, mutual benefit, and win-win outcomes. The blame game between Pakistan and the Taliban continued unabated. The Haqqani Network, once seen as an extension of Pakistan’s ISI, was accused of using the TTP against Pakistan. Asif Durrani, Pakistan’s former special envoy to Afghanistan, warned in December 2024 that Sirajuddin Haqqani poses a major threat to the stability of both the Taliban and the region. Pakistan’s attempt to sow division between the Haqqani network and Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada is evident, particularly in light of Islamabad’s proposal for direct talks. A suicide attack in Kabul that same month claimed the life of Khalil ul Rehman Haqqani, a high-ranking member of the Haqqani network, Sirajuddin Haqqani’s uncle, and the acting refugee minister under the Taliban. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) eventually claimed responsibility, but the highly sophisticated nature of the operation raised questions about the involvement of a professional intelligence agency, many of which remain unanswered.
The lack of foreseeable improvement in Pakistan-Taliban relations is forcing China to reconsider extending the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to Afghanistan, opting instead for costlier Central Asian rail links to achieve its BRI goals in Afghanistan. Thus, the Taliban and China are focused on establishing a direct trade link with Afghanistan through the WC, with security as a key consideration.
China’s progress may be slow without assurances of regional security, particularly given its reliance on Central Asian states and, critically, Russia’s role as the main security provider. At the October 2024 Moscow talks, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that the return of foreign military infrastructure to Afghanistan and the establishment of new bases in neighboring countries are unacceptable. Sergey Shoygu, Russia’s security council secretary, visited Kabul next month. The visit coincided with two events. A cross-border attack from Afghanistan into Tajikistan’s Shamsiddin Shohin district (bordering Badakhshan) killed one Chinese citizen and injured five others, including three Chinese nationals. The CSTO has announced its plan to reinforce the border region between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. The plan included stages like; clarifying capabilities, practical implementations, full deployment and adjusting weapon ranges. The plan is part of establishing a security belt around Afghanistan. Much of the security infrastructure along the borders of Afghanistan, China, and Central Asia is already in place.
Under the guise of the Tunxi initiative, China seeks to align its policies with Central Asian Republics while simultaneously exploiting Afghanistan’s rare earth materials and strategic minerals for economic gain, minimizing collateral damage. Afghanistan possesses an estimated 2.3 billion metric tons of iron ore and 30 million metric tons of copper, and is believed to hold one of the world’s largest lithium reserves. Commercial mineral production in Afghanistan was hindered by security and connectivity concerns during the Western occupation. The deteriorating relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan may prevent the success of China’s ambition to incorporate Afghanistan into the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It’s possible that China has determined that direct engagement with the Taliban is more economically beneficial than using Pakistan as an intermediary. China’s sole option is to establish a direct trade link with Afghanistan via Wakhan.
Wakhan: key to China’s Afghan mineral strategy
Mr. Zhao, the Chinese Ambassador to Afghanistan, and Mohammad Yunus Akhundzada, the Taliban’s acting minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, travelled to the WC in August 2024 to inspect the road construction and investigate the potential for a railway.
Soon after the Taliban takeover in 2021, despite warnings from the Chinese embassy against “blind” visits, officials from numerous Chinese companies rushed to Afghanistan on special visas to inspect potential lithium and other mineral projects. The trend shifted after a significant terrorist attack at a Chinese-owned hotel in Kabul during December 2022, leading the Chinese government to advise its citizens to depart Afghanistan. China’s sustained diplomatic and economic relations with the Taliban meant that the earlier pace of visits only returned gradually. Subsequent to that event, no similarly extensive attacks against Chinese nationals have been recorded in Afghanistan; nevertheless, a persistent threat to their safety continues. In January 2025, a Chinese citizen was fatally wounded in Afghanistan’s Takhar province; the ISKP has claimed responsibility.
The Taliban held 1,382 diplomatic meetings with 80 countries during their first three years in power, from August 2021 to February 2024, according to a US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) report. China tops the list with 215 meetings; Turkey is next, with 194. According to the Taliban’s Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, they signed 200 mining contracts during this period, primarily with Chinese companies.
Following the Taliban takeover, China was the first nation to officially appoint an ambassador to Afghanistan in September 2023. Following that, Ambassador Zhao actively engaged with the Taliban leadership in charge of mining, oil, trade, and regional communications. The institutionalization of dialogue between China and the Taliban government is well underway. In April 2024, the third China-Afghanistan liaison mechanism meeting focused on humanitarian aid and economic rebuilding convened in Beijing. Discussions included exploring the feasibility of opening the WC.
China has commenced exportation of mining equipment to Afghanistan. In August 2024, the first shipment of Afghan minerals was transported to China through the Iranian port of Chabahar. A few cases of Chinese nationals’ engagement in unlawful mining practices were reported during this period. Five men, including two Chinese citizens, were arrested by the Taliban in January 2023 for attempting to smuggle approximately 1,000 metric tons of lithium-containing rocks out of the country through Pakistan.
Mining contracts are a major source of revenue for the Taliban. In 2024, their estimations put its revenue at nearly $100 million. Large-scale mining operations by Chinese companies at sites like the Aynak copper mine—potentially the world’s second largest—will necessitate a substantial increase in skilled labor for processing and the development of economically viable export routes. In a meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping in July 2024, Tajik President Emomali Rahman emphasised on development of transport corridor between China-Tajikistan-Afghanistan. Currently, China’s goods reach Afghanistan by rail, traveling through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, a journey of 20-22 days. The closest port to Afghanistan’s eastern and southern mining provinces is 1200-1500 kilometers away. Because the route traverses mountainous terrain, travel time and costs are increased by transit fees charged by Pakistan and Iran. China attempted to ship goods to Kabul utilizing the Kashgar TIR logistics hub and the Khunjerab Pass. Frequent protests in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) disrupt trade, and security concerns and strained Afghanistan-Pakistan relations may deter China from relying on this route.
To lessen its reliance on Pakistan, Afghanistan is negotiating with the Central Asian Republics, Iran, Russia, India, and China to expedite the North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC), thereby integrating itself into global trade routes. Conversely, Afghanistan’s strategic focus on projects like TAPI, TAP, and CASA could increase Pakistan’s reliance on it. To facilitate trade and lay a fiber optic cable, the Taliban is pushing for the completion of the WC’s connection to the Karakoram Highway (KKH). Pakistan also aims to connect with Central Asia, avoiding Afghanistan, with the WC representing the most feasible route. It is plausible that the Taliban assesses the Chinese economic presence in the WC as a factor that might discourage Pakistan from interfering in Afghanistan’s vulnerable regions.
China’s ability to send workers to accelerate Afghan projects has been and will likely remain hampered by the Taliban’s enforcement of their interpretation of Sharia Law. While this shouldn’t hinder early excavation, it may cause problems later due to the increased need for skilled labor. This provides added justification for China to build processing units closer to Afghanistan, while remaining within China’s territory, possibly near the Chinese end of the Wakhjir Pass.
Strategic minerals are crucial for the development and mass production of key technologies. Afghanistan is the focus of international attention in this matter. In June 2024, US Special Representative to Afghanistan Thomas West stated that the US does not view Afghanistan as an arena for competition with China and Russia. Although the global competition for minerals and the creation of new trade routes among major powers is widely acknowledged, China currently leads the race in Afghanistan, and the WC is crucial to its success.
The article has been previously featured in bimonthly journal of the Institute of Social and Cultural Studies, Kolkata, Volume V, Issue 4 (February-March 2025).
[1] Vahid Brown and Don Rassler, “Fountainhead of Jihad; The Haqqani Nexus”, 2016, Hachette Book Publishing India Pvt. Ltd., p. 113
[2] Ibid
[i] Barnett R Rubin, “The Fragmentation of Afghanistan”, 2002, Yale University press, p. 49
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect Wesal TV’s editorial policy.
Views: 60
