The findings from the “20 Years of the Republic” program on Wesal TV indicate that the unilateral decisions made during the Bonn and Doha meetings significantly contributed to the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. This series, which explores the history of the Republic from its inception to its fall (2001-2021), examines the developments, challenges, and shortcomings that ultimately led to the Taliban’s resurgence.
Interviews with 21 officials and experts from various sectors, including former government cabinet members, military officials, lawmakers, and civil society leaders, highlight the multifaceted nature of the Republic’s downfall. These discussions, broadcasted without censorship on Wesal TV, delve into the factors that contributed to the Republic’s collapse on August 15, 2021.
The interviews suggest that the collapse can be analyzed through multiple lenses. While the findings are preliminary and warrant further research, they attempt to uncover the various aspects of this historical period.
The sudden transformation that affected every Afghan, from children to elders, has left many unanswered questions, prompting Wesal TV to launch a podcast series titled “Twenty Years of the Republic,” featuring interviews with Afghan politicians and activists.
The factors highlighted in the interviews may not encompass all aspects of the situation, and further research is necessary to fully understand the complexities surrounding the collapse of the republic system. The interviews aim to briefly explore and explain the potential causes and dynamics of the Republic’s fall.
These discussions also shed light on how a system built over two decades changed abruptly within just a few days, impacting everyone—from Afghan children to the elderly—and leaving many unanswered questions. To address these queries and seek pathways for the future, Wesal TV has launched a podcast series titled “Twenty Years of the Republic,” running from December 7, 2023, to July 31, 2024, featuring interviews with 21 Afghan politicians and activists.
Wesal TV also attempted to interview officials from the Islamic Emirate and their political opponents, but they declined to participate.
One-sided decisions at Bonn and Doha
Participants in these discussions point to the unilateral decisions made during the Bonn and Doha meetings as pivotal in the Republic’s collapse in 2021. They argue that these decisions weakened the government, leading to its downfall following the Doha agreement. Many also cite corruption and ethnic prejudices as directly linked to these decisions.
A-The Doha Agreement and political talks:
A consensus among interviewees is that the U.S.-Taliban peace talks held in Doha—conducted without the Afghan government—were crucial in undermining the Afghan government.
Most participants in the discussion believe that the peace talks between the United States and the Taliban, held in Doha without the involvement of the Afghan government, were a crucial factor in the collapse of the republican government. They argue that these negotiations focused not on achieving peace for Afghanistan, but rather on the withdrawal of American and other foreign forces. Following the signing of the agreement, they assert, the collapse of the republic became inevitable.
Former Ambassador of Afghanistan to Iran, Abdul Ghafoor Lewal, stated, “Recognition was stripped from the Afghan government in Doha. The international community and the U.S. kept the government dependent on daily aid while granting legitimacy to another warring group. Additionally, we remain unaware of the secret annexes created during the Doha meetings, which are still being implemented. In this context, when a government is reliant on external aid and the world simultaneously recognizes its opposing faction, the continuation of that government becomes impossible. I attribute the collapse to the recognition given in Doha and the ongoing implementation of those secret annexes. However, it is important to acknowledge that internal factors were just as significant as external ones in the government’s downfall.”
Former Chief of Staff of Afghanistan, General Sher Mohammad Karimi, also regards the political talks in Qatar as significant to the Afghan government’s downfall, citing them as a key reason for its weakening. He describes the collapse as a political failure: “The talks were held at a large and strategic level, but all decisions made in Doha were one-sided, with the Afghan government excluded. Meanwhile, the Taliban’s influence grew stronger by the day. The involvement of the U.S. and other NATO members, particularly the role of Pakistan, heavily favored the Taliban. No guarantees were obtained from the Taliban regarding their compliance with these decisions, which raises questions about why no one is holding them accountable today. This political failure led commanders to believe that the state was on the brink of collapse, prompting them to question their loyalty.”
General Karimi emphasizes that various factors contributed to the fall of the Afghan state, including political, military, foreign, and domestic issues. He highlights the military sector as particularly critical: “The leadership of the National Army, as well as the security forces, was left without direction as the government approached its collapse. Although the army was well-trained, it was unsupervised, with soldiers, sergeants, and low-level commanders acting without accountability or clear instructions. When everyone operates independently, the market and administration suffer.”
Karimi adds, “Beyond political failures, the leadership of the armed forces was weak. They failed to unify the security forces, even in emergency situations. While they could have taken military action, that opportunity was lost. It’s easy to speak from outside the country; one must be present to fully understand the complexities of the situation.”
Shahrazad Akbar critiques the Doha agreement, asserting that the process cannot be considered a genuine peace initiative or an intra-Afghan peace process. “The Qatar process was solely between the Americans and the Taliban,” she states. “There was an agreement for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, but I do not recognize it as a peace agreement. A meaningful peace process between the Republic and the Taliban never truly began; such a process can only be meaningful when both sides are committed to making peace.”
Regarding the Taliban’s intentions, Akbar argues that they were focused on winning rather than fostering peace. “The Taliban, along with some factions in the Republic, sought a complete victory for themselves. They were not interested in power-sharing or forming a collective government, nor in creating a situation where others held any power or authority. Thus, when we discuss the Taliban and the year 2021, we must clarify that there was no genuine peace process—only an agreement for the withdrawal of American forces.”
Engineer Mohammad Amin Karim, a leading member of Hizb-i-Islami Afghanistan (HIA), criticizes the Doha agreement, stating, “The agreement was made solely between the United States and the Taliban, leaving both the Afghan nation and government behind.”
Dr. Khushal Rohi, a civil society leader and head of the National Alliance political party, identifies two major reasons for the collapse of the republican system related to the Doha negotiations, criticizing U.S. policies in this context. He argues, “The U.S. approach and its political maneuvers significantly contributed to the downfall of the system. During the Doha talks, the Afghan government was largely ignored.”
Rohi adds, “The Taliban were given the impression that they were the victors and that the system would be theirs. This narrative instilled a sense of inevitability in them. For instance, when it was announced that 60,000 individuals who worked with the government would be evacuated, it suggested that the government was collapsing, much like the situation in Vietnam. This created a demoralizing atmosphere for Afghanistan’s armed forces and politicians.”
He also points to the irresponsible withdrawal of American forces as a key factor in the government’s collapse: “Their hasty withdrawal did not facilitate a transition that could ensure the system’s stability; instead, it precipitated a crisis based on an agreement.”
Ex-senator Anarkali Hunarya says the psychological war has become more intense and the media also participated in the propaganda campaign following the US decision to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan.
She called negotiations after the Doha agreement were symbolic, saying the main reason for the collapse of the previous government was signing the Doha agreement, as all decisions were made there.
She continued if there had been talks or anything later, they were all cosmetic. Nothing was done to pin down the Taliban and decisions about Afghanistan’s future were made in Doha.
Ahmad Nader Naderi, a member of the Republic’s peace negotiation team, who was asked this query, replied the Doha accord was one of the main reasons for the collapse of the previous government.
Other interviewees held the same opinion about the Doha deal.
B: Non-inclusion of all political parties that attended the Bonn conference and improper distribution of power based on ethnic quotas.
Many participants of the interviews refer to the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in response to questions about the factors of the collapse.
The guests linked the collapse of the republican government to the removal of Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami from political power at the Bonn Conference.
They say the removal of Taliban had led to resumption of war in the country. They also believe this problem could have been resolved at that time and a solid foundation of the new system laid.
A second major problem with the Bonn conference was the improper distribution of power.
Government positions were unfairly shared between warring organisations based on tribal quotas without any regard for Afghanistan’s realities and a fair and democratic process, the guests added.
This was the reason that over time isolated groups resumed and expanded their activities until the collapse of the previous government.
Journalist and writer Mohammad Zubair Shafiqi says about the Bonn conference: “A very bad foundation was laid at that conference. Instead of the nation, a system was created based on tribes; Unfortunately, instead of reform, it led to a decline, islands of power were created.”
He continued: “The distance between the nation and the government has increased, ethnic prejudices have been encouraged. Instead of establishing a system, the international community spent dollops of aid in Afghanistan in very bad ways.”
Former education minister Dr. Mohammad Ibrahim Shinwari also linked the resumption of war in the country to the exclusion of Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami from the government at the Bonn Conference.
He said: “The removal of Hizb-i-Islami and the Taliban is usually considered a reason for future wars and disputes.”
Anarkali Hunaryar pointed out: “After the Taliban were kept out of power at the Bonn conference, the group returned to war a few years later.”
Political activist and writer Dr. Yar Mohammad Tarakai also faulted the Bonn meeting for building a political system on the basis of tribes, languages and shares. Foreigners handed over power to warring parties, but they behaved in a biased manner and sought personal revenge.
Taraki added they were warring groups and organisations, which did not know much about government affairs.
Other participants also had similar views about the Bonn Conference.
Additional reasons of collapse:
Apart from the impacts of Doha and Bonn conferences on the collapse of the democratic government in Afghanistan, other factors such as weakness, instability, distrust, corruption and the wide gap between the government and the nation made the second- and third-degree reasons for the collapse of the government, believe a number of Afghan officials and political analysts.
The analysts said nevertheless the previous government had some achievements, but it collapsed, which was inevitable because there was no solution to the mentioned problems.
Now the new government faces the same situations or even worse, bringing reforms to the previous government was easier, which must had been done to prevent its collapse as it brought everything to zero, they added.
The participants of the “20 Years of the Republic” discussions named following reasons as additional factors behind the collapse of the government:
-Taliban’s no faith in the government.
-Excessively relying on foreigners and foreign aid
-Mismanagement and incompetent political leaders and officials
-Immature political leaders, their selfishness and rivalries
-Administrative and financial corruption
-The increasing gap between the urban and rural areas, lack of justice in rural areas and the deprivation of such areas from the services provided by the government.
-Such factors further widened the gap and finally led to a matter of clash between the government and rural areas for decades.
-Lack of rule of law
-Keeping governmental institutions weak, but investing on other parallel organizations to the government such as NGOs, provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) and security companies that performed the same duty of the government.
-Lack of prioritization in the use of resources in the implementation of development projects.
-Giving much power to powerful individuals and keeping them in power from the beginning to the end
-The abuse of freedom of speech
-Not considering some vital and important national issues seriously, vanishing optimism
-Dealing improperly with some important issues by officials, political leaders, writers, enlightened figures.
-Spreading negative propagandas against the government, military and other institutions of the government
-Loss of moral
-The increasing death rate in the lines of forces, daily 300 people were killed
-The people got threatened by the use of new tactics used in war by Taliban, explosions, suicide attacks and the ordinary people lost their hope and they lived in fear in big cities of the country.
-Not strengthening the national institutions
-Not putting an end to the war, disloyalty of the officials for working for peace
-Lack of intra-Afghan peace process and the lack of real peace negotiations
-The existence of impunity culture
-The withdrawal of foreign forces
-The mistakes of foreigners in political issues of Afghanistan
-The disunity of politicians and the lack of political consensus
-The absence of military leadership
-The rivalries between global superpowers and neighboring countries
The national army had the capacity to fight, but it did fight due to the political failure of the government during the days of the collapse, General Karimi said.
He said: “Although the national army was a light national army, it was well-equipped with light weapons, trained well and had the capability to keep the security of every remote district of the country such as Helmand’s Sangin district and other districts. The Army defended every district well, none of the district fell to the hands of rivals. The army fought well, as I said weak political will, heartlessness, lack of backup support, logistics and lack of leadership were other reasons that led the national army to refrain from fighting, it waited to get the command from its senior commanders which then it left its location to the Taliban. The situation led the army not to fight and the rivals took all the places. One of other reasons of not fighting was the lack of command and management of the armed forces and no existence of back up support.”
Dr. Khoshal Rohi termed moral degradation and negative propaganda as the main factors behind the collapse. “There was a propaganda that politically things were over and don’t fight anymore, when two or three provinces fell, the thinking was developed that everyone else will be killed wasted, there was such a spirit that the Americans and the Taliban were together, there was no longer any motive for war.”
Former Attorney General Hamidi said when 200 people in a government have 200 different motives the collapse of this type of government is imminent. He added different agendas, different programs and short-term policies were created by Afghans and foreigners to the government, there was no specific roadmap for Afghanistan, and even the decisions in the Bonn conference were not the decisions of Afghans that were part of the conference.
In the same way, in other areas, such as financial expenses being paid to Afghanistan from outside, relying on foreign resources and projects and not recognizing the priorities, not having full ownership of the projects and not having a sense of ownership, on the other hand, the presence of conflicting, opposing and distrustful forces at the top of the government, which wasted a lot of time and energy in disagreements with each other, the media, civil and political movements were all divided in this way.
Referring to the claims of western media outlets regarding the all Afghan government, he said: “The way Western media blamed that all the problems existed on the Afghan side, there was corruption, violation of law and lack of capacity, this is very unfortunate when the make this accusation because they were partners in all and even the west was the real actor behind all this, in my view, there were two main factor which triggered the collapse one was one was the government armed opponents disbelieve on the political process, peace process and the empowerment of masses, our political forces never believed on elections because they knew that power could only be achieved through forces, why did not they respected the election result, the main point is that political and armed rival groups in Afghanistan only believed on power and nothing else.”
Dr. Ghafoor Liwal, termed dependency on foreign aid as the main factor behind the weakness of the government and said the previous Afghan government deliberately dependent on foreign aid from the beginning to the end.
“Unfortunately, after Bonn decisions, in all the past twenty years, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan remained largely dependent on foreign resources or was kept dependent on foreign aid; I once taught regional strategic issues to some employees of the Ministry of Defense of Afghanistan, I heard from a high-ranking general there that we do not have strategic reserves, at another place they said: “In the past 20 years, so much was given to the Afghan National Army in the language of these military personnel that they could defend themselves that day.”
He continued: “Unfortunately, the ability and capacity that should have been in the government of Afghanistan were not there because the Americans had created enough difficulties in what should have been a permanent government, the opponents in the government had been partners in such a way that half of the body was paralyzed by them, all the institutional partners of the government, the Jihadi partners of the government pulled government legs, committed corruption, abducting people, had small crime networks like stealing mobile phones, kidnapping, grabbing land and turning the atmosphere of Afghanistan into an atmosphere of terror, practically the government was broken from within.”
Former Kunduz Governor Abdul Jabbar Naeemi termed the unrealistic approach of Afghan politicians and people towards the peace process and considering peace talks not serious as the main factors behind the collapse of the former Republic Regime.
“Most of the Afghans were thinking that the peace process is a very good and strong process and the result will be very good, but unfortunately some politicians were not convinced of this, they wanted to overthrow the government of the republic, what they did to the republic, what they did to the president, and what they did in the media, it was clear and obvious that these politicians were taking opportunities from the government, but they were not loyal to it, on the contrary, they were trying to destroy it.”
Naimi also said that the government, writers and other Afghans unfortunately played a negative role in the Qatar peace process and neglected it. He also criticizes the wrong use of freedom of speech and said, “There was no control on media, the freedom of speech broke all limits, beyond the limit accusations were leveled against personal privacy, the system, political persons and so on.
Ahmad Nader Naderi, former head of the Civil Services and Administrative Reform Commission said that besides other issues non-seriousness towards serious issues was one of the reasons behind the fall of the Republic Regime.
Shaharzad Akbar, former head of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, had immunity for those who participated in civil war, committed corruption, and persecution and violated the laws led to the weakness and fall of the government. it functioned like cancer and perishes the government.
Anarkali Hunaryar, also termed internal issues a reason behind the fall of the Republic Regime and said: “We had many internal issues, sometimes a flag raised from the north and sometimes from another place claiming the system of their choice and another factor was linguistic and tribal biases amongst Afghans which is still talk of the town in parts of the world.”
Former Attorney General Hamidullah referred to another point and said previous political opponents had shares in the cabinet and were part of the government and similarly they worked as an opposition outside the government, these people never served for the benefit of the government and were engaged against each other.
Writer Mohammad Zubair Shafiqi said after the Doha Agreement between the Taliban and the US an opportunity for peace between Afghan political leaders and the Taliban was provided, both sides were ready for talks after a lengthy conflict but they lost this opportunity.
Another participant pointed the finger of blame at the Afghan government, which, in order to maintain power, did not play responsibly in the peace sector and sacrificed the 20-year-old system of power, they thought that foreigners would support them instead of the Taliban but they were wrong.
Most of the interviewees believed that the Afghan government and nation were not given the opportunity to negotiate peace and that the decision was made between the United States and the Taliban in the absence of the previous government. They did not want to talk seriously with the Afghan government as one side and before the continuation and end of the talks, they seized the provinces and the whole country.
Former Deputy Wolesi Jirga Head Mohammad Nazir Ahmadzai termed the absence of a political consensus as one of the main factors and said a specific group was responsible for the lack of political consensus in the last days, they kept the president busy in other matters and for this reason, he remained disconnected with political and tribal elders.
Abdullah Khairkhwa, former administrative chief of the Qarabagh district in Ghazni province, said that the collapse started with the process of Qatar, but there are also shortcomings on the ground or on the battlefield side. Khairkha added that there was no supply to the security forces in the districts, the militants were equipped with advanced equipment and weapons such as night vision and laser binoculars, food, ammunition, heavy weapons and rocket shells, lately security forces ran out of equipment and with one Kalashnikov there could be no war..
According to him, in the last days of the Republic, there were incompetent district governors, governors and officials who in some cases threatened the local officials who were fighting seriously against the opponents of the government.
Former Kabul University Head Hameedullah Farooqi considered the government change, peace and fighting beyond the range of Afghans and their authority and said: “Unfortunately, the change of Afghanistan’s system, the continuation of war and the arrival or change of peace was not in the hands of Afghans alone, and the contribution of Afghans or Afghanistan as a whole was very limited; The global powers and our neighboring countries were very involved in the discussion of the change or collapse of the Afghan system and they wanted the same situation to happen in Afghanistan.”
Protection of the Republic Regime’s achievements:
Most of the interviewed persons termed the Doha Agreement and the Bonn conference as the main factors behind the fall of the Republic Regime, according to them both events facilitated the fall of the previous regime.
Despite all the shortcomings, most of the participants of the interviews talk at length about the many developments and achievements in the various sectors of the government and in the lives of the people during the republic, and they specifically mentioned many achievements and examples in the interviews. It is benefiting people now and in the future.
They believe that Afghanistan has lost a lot with the fall of the republic, and they consider the current situation to be much worse than the previous situation.
Former Attorney General Hamidi regarding the reformation of the past regime said: “The reformation of the past system was simple compared to the installation of a dictatorial regime.”
Referring to the fall of Afghanistan’s republic regime, he said: “It should not end irresponsibly the way it did, there was hope that things would have concluded responsibly.”
20-year of Republic Regime, information of 21 participants:
1-Discussion with Dr. Mohammad Ibrahim Shinwari, former head of the National Food and Drugs Authroity (NFDA) during the Republic Regime about education
2-Discussion on local governance with Abdul Jabbar Naimi, former Kunduz province governor during the Republic Regime about local governance
3-Discussion with Gen. Sher Mohammad Karimi, former Army Chief of the Afghan National Army, about Afghanistan’s military sector and the fall of the Republic Regime
4-Discussion with Mohammad Farid Hamidi, former attorney general, about the Afghanistan justice system
5-Discussion with Hameedullah Farooqi, former minister of Martyrs and Disabled and head of the Kabul University, about higher education, universities affairs, quality, the role and shortcomings of these educational institutions
6-Discussion with Dr. Khoshal Rohai, head of the Afghanistan National Axis Party and head of the Afghan Cultural Associations Jirga, about the formation of civil societies, their outcomes, problems and the role of these institutions in the political and social segments of Afghanistan
7-Discussion with Mohammad Nazir Ahmadzai, former deputy head of the Wolesi Jirga, about the activities of Wolesi Jirga, differences between the Wolesi Jirga and government the Kochies situation and the role of public representatives in peace process
8-Discussion with the former head of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission head and state minister for human rights about the inception of Human Rights Commission and its activities
9-Discussion with Mohammad Zubair Shafiqi, journalist and writer, about the role of media
10-Discussion with Najib Azad, former deputy spokesperson of the Presidential Palace, about the reasons behind the fall of the Republic regime
11-Discussion with Dr. Anarkali Hunaryar, former Wolesi Jirga member, about the life of Afghan Sikhs and Hindus during the republic period and after that, security, chaos, attacks on their religious places of worship.
12-Discussion with Shahrazad Akbar, the former head of the Independent Human Rights Commission of the Republic regime, about the mindset, public awareness, the activities of the Human Rights Commission and other related institutions in Afghanistan, and the current state of human rights.
13-Discussion with former Minister Abdul Bari Jahani about the role of tribes and religious segments in political and social changes in Afghanistan.
14-Discussion with Political activist and writer Dr. Yar Muhammad Taraki about the reasons for the fall of the republic and the democratic state of Afghanistan led by Dr. Najibullah and the similarities between the fall of these two states.
15-Discussion with Pakhtunkhwa politician and former senator Afrasiab Khattak about the current tensions on both sides of the Durand Line during the Republican government and Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan’s political and other issues
16-Discussion with Dr. Abdul Ghafoor Lewal, former ambassador of Afghanistan in Iran, about the Republic Regime’s partner in post Bonn conference era and the mishandling, the Qatar peace process and the role of the Afghan government.
17-Discussion with Irfanullah Irfan, the representative of the people of Kabul in the Wolesi Jirga, about the performance, problems and achievements of the Wolesi Jirga in the previous system, as well as the contribution and responsibilities of the Wolesi Jirga and the previous government in the peace negotiations.
18-Discussion with Abdullah Khirkhwa, former district chief of the Qarabagh district in central Ghazni province, about the state of governance in the districts and the interaction between the government officials and the people, shortcomings, challenges, the relations of the regional officials with the provincial and central institutions and the obstacles and threats facing them.
19-Discussion with Eng. Mohammad Amin Karim, a member of the Hizb-e-Islami Afghanistan (HIA) about HIA negotiations with the government, the problems of the government, the armed opposition, the national army and other topics..
20-Discussion with Ahmad Nader Nadiri, former head of the IARCSC and current expert at Stanford University about the problems, challenges, corruption, the structure of systems and the appointment of young people in key posts.
21-Discussion with Mushtaq Rahimi, former secretary general of the High Peace Council, regarding peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan and issues started from the beginning of the past republic regime till its collapse
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